Oslo

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The Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles (DOP), were finalized in Oslo, Norway on August 20, 1993, and subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993, with Mahmoud Abbas signing for the Palestine Liberation Organization and Shimon Peres signing for the State of Israel. It was witnessed by Warren Christopher for the United States and Andrei Kozyrev for Russia, in the presence of US President Bill Clinton and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with the PLO's Chairman Yasser Arafat.

The Oslo Accords were a culmination of a series of secret and public agreements, dating particularly from the Madrid Conference of 1991 onwards, and negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (acting as representatives of the Palestinian people) in 1993 as part of a peace process trying to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Despite the high hopes expressed in the Accords and in the subsequent agreements, which also promised the normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab world, the conflict has not been resolved.

Contents

Background

The talks leading to the agreement were initially held in London, then later moved to Oslo. Main architects behind the plan were Johan Jørgen Holst (the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs), Terje Rød-Larsen and Mona Juul. The negotiations were reportedly conducted in total secrecy.

Principles of the Accords

In essence, the accords call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank and affirm the Palestinian right to self-government within those areas through the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian rule would last for a five year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning not later than May 1996). Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements in the area, security and borders were deliberately excluded from the Accords and left to be decided. The interim self-government was to be granted in phases.

Until a final status accord was established, West Bank and Gaza would be divided into three zones:

  • Area A - full control of the Palestinian Authority.
  • Area B - Palestinian civil control, Israeli military control.
  • Area C - full Israeli control.

Together with the principles the two groups signed Letters of Mutual Recognition - The Israeli government recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism, violence and its desire for the destruction of Israel.

The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, an elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolution 242 and Resolution 338, an integral part of the whole peace process.

In order that the Palestinians should govern themselves according to democratic principles, free and general political elections would be held for the Council.

Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit.

The five-year transitional period would begin with the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Permanent status negotiations would commence as soon as possible between Israel and the Palestinians. The negotiations should cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

There will be a transfer of authority from the IDF to the authorised Palestinians, concerning education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.

The Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats.

An Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols.

A redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would take place.

Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to the Declaration of Principles and the Agreed Minutes pertaining to it, should be regarded as part of it.

Annexes of the accords

Annex 2: Withdrawal of Israeli forces

An agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

The above agreement will include, among other things:

  • Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the Palestinian representatives.
  • Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.
  • Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
  • A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
  • Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
  • Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
  • Arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: Gaza - Egypt; and Jericho - Jordan.

Annex 3: Economic cooperation

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for economic cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

  • Cooperation in the field of water.
  • Cooperation in the field of electricity.
  • Cooperation in the field of energy.
  • Cooperation in the field of finance.
  • Cooperation in the field of transport and communications.
  • Cooperation in the field of trade and commerce.
  • Cooperation in the field of industry.
  • Cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and
  • Cooperation in social welfare issues.
  • An environmental protection plan.
  • Cooperation in the field of communication and media.

Annex 4: Regional development

The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7.

Agreed minutes of the accords

Minute A: General understandings

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians through the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in the agreed minutes below.

Minute B: Specific understandings

Article IV: Council's jurisdiction

It was to be understood that: Jurisdiction of the Council would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.

Article VI (2): Transferring authority

It was agreed that the transfer of authority would be as follows: The Palestinians would inform the Israelis s of the names of the authorised Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that would be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

Article VII (2): Cooperation

The Interim Agreement would also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5): Israel's powers

The withdrawal of the military government would not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII: Police

It was understood that the Interim Agreement would include arrangements for cooperation and coordination. It was also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police would be accomplished in a phased manner.

Article X: Designating officials

It was agreed that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee which would reach decisions by agreement.

Annex II: Israel's continuing responsibilities

It was understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel would continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians would be allowed to continue using roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

The acceptance of the accords by the two peoples

The accords aroused in the two peoples, the Israeli and the Palestinian, a wave of hope to end the violence, but not everyone participated in this hope.

In Israel, a hard argument developed around the accords. Opposing the support of the left wing, there was strong resistance from the right wing. After a two day discussion in the Knesset on the government proclamation in the issue of the accord and the exchange of the letters, on September 23 1993 a vote of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained.

The Palestinian reactions to the accords were not homogeneous, either. The Fatah accepted the accords, but the Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which were known as the "refusal organizations", objected to the accords since they completely denounced Israel's right to exist, refusing to recognize what they dubbed the "Zionist entity". Their resistance was expressed in their acts of terror.

On both sides there were fears of the other side's intentions. Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were not sincere in their desire to reach peace and coexistence with Israel, but relate to that as part of the Ten Point Program (which is called in Israel Tokhnit HaSHlavim or Torat HaSHlavim). For evidence they brought expressions of Yasser Arafat in Palestinian forums in which he compared the accord to the Khodeyba agreement that the prophet Muhammad signed with the sons of the tribe of Quraish. Those expressions could be understood also as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords in accordance with historical-religious precedent, but also as hinting to dishonesty of the intentions, since this agreement which was signed to 10 years was violated by Muhammad after a year and a half , after much provocation and violations of the terms of the truce by the Quraish. The Israelis trust in the accord was undermined also by the fact that after the signing of the accord the terrorist attacks against Israel did not cease and even intensified, which could be explained as an attempt of the terror organizations to thwart the peace process.

On the other hand, the murder of the 29 Muslims while praying in the Cave of the Patriarchs by Barukh Goldshteyn destabilized the Palestinians' trust in the process. Also, the expansion of the settlements and blockades which caused the deterioration of economic conditions caused frustration and a corresponding descent in support for the accord and those who stood behind its ratification.

Subsequent negotiations

In addition to the first accord, namely the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government, other more specific accords are often informally also known as "Oslo":

Oslo 2

Additional agreements

Additional Israeli-Palestinian documents related to the Oslo Accords are:


Loss of credibility

Since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Oslo Accords are viewed with increasing disfavor by the Israeli public. In May 2000, seven years after the Oslo Accords and five months before the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a survey by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at the University of Tel Aviv found that: 39% of all Israelis support the Accords and that 32% believe that the Accords will result in peace in the next few years. [1]. By contrast, the May 2004 survey found that 26% of all Israelis support the Accords and 18% believe that the Accords will result in peace in the next few years.

Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

References

See also

Issues

People

External links

bg:Договори от Осло de:Oslo-Abkommen es:Acuerdos de Oslo fr:Accords d'Oslo gl:Acordos de Oslo id:Persetujuan Damai Oslo he:הסכמי אוסלו nl:Oslo-akkoorden ja:オスロ合意 pl:Porozumienia z Oslo pt:Acordos de paz de Oslo sv:Osloprocessen

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